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Abstract
Modeling the conditions for the emergence of extremism is a very important
problem, with clear applications for describing the interaction among individuals.
Traditional models either are not suited for the task, as in the case of discrete mod-
els, or, like Bounded Confidence models, are built with rules that make opinions
tend to a common ground between agents or not change at all. Continuous Opin-
ions and Discrete Actions (CODA) model allowed us to observe the emergence of
extremist agents, even when every agent was initially a moderate, due to local influ-
ence effects. In this paper, the problem of emergence of extremism will be addressed
by introducing a middle discrete option in the CODA model, making it similar to
a Potts model. Different scenarios for the third option will be discussed: when it is
equivalent to withholding judgment, when it is a real third option and when it is a
real, middle option. The effects on the opinions will be studied and its effects on
extremism discussed. Withholding judgment seems to have an unexpected effect,
causing the diminishing of moderate opinions in the long run. For a central third
opinion, we find that, under specific conditions, this new choice can act as a buffer
between the extreme choices.
1 Introduction
In order to describe the social evolution of the strength of opinions about an issue, models
that allow for a large number of possible internal opinions are needed, or even continuous
opinions, as in the Bounded Confidence models [1, 2]. However, those models only use
tendency towards consensus. Although they can be useful at describing the spread of
an already existing extremist position [3, 4, 5, 6], they are not capable of explaining the
emergence of extreme opinions.
On the other hand, people often express themselves by choosing from one of a small
number of options. This choice aspect is well captured by the discrete models [7, 8, 9, 10],
but at the cost of measuring the strength of the opinions. While one can introduce
in any of these models the difference between opinion and verbalization [11], it is more
natural to introduce models based on Bayesian Decision Theory [12], where the verbalized
choices and inner probabilistic opinions are naturally defined. The application of that
1
idea to discrete choices lead to the development of the Continuous Opinions and Discrete
Actions (CODA) model [13, 14] where the emergence of extremism was observed as a
consequence of the local reinforcement of the opinions. An extension of those ideas using
perceptrons in a cultural environment where many issues are debated also showed regimes
where extremism arises naturally [15]. Bayesian update rules was also used for continuous
verbalized information and results similar to those observed in the Bounded Confidence
models were obtained as a particular case [16]. While no emergence of extremism was
observed, when agents updated also their uncertainty, stubbornness was observed as a
consequence of the rules.
The discrete choices used in the CODA model, however, were only binary choices,
represented as a spin associated to each agent i, si = ±1. Therefore, it makes sense to
explore the consequences for the dynamics of the system and, in particular, the emergence
of extremism when we introduce a third choice in the problem [17, 18, 19]. Two cases
will be explored in this paper. First, we will see that the binary CODA model allows for
the easy introduction of a middle, agnostic, third choice. This corresponds to the case
where no option is made between two real choices when the agent is not really sure and,
therefore, it makes no claims about its preferred option. The second case we will study
corresponds to the introduction of a real third choice. We will investigate both the case
where the third option is independent of the other two and where it is a middle choice
between two extremes.
2 Witholding Judgement in the CODA model
Assume there are two real choices si = ±1 agent i can make, associated with a decision.
In order to evaluate which choice is better, i has an internal subjective probability, pi
associated with the possibility that the choice si = +1 is the best one by si = sign(pi−0.5).
If the agent believes its neighbors are mostly like right than wrong, that is, each neighbor
will choose the best option with probability α > 0.5, then, when observing the choices of
a neighbor j, agent i should update its internal probability using Bayes Theorem.
It was shown previously that by using the transformed variable νi = ln(pi/1− p+ i),
the problem becomes much simpler. Each time sj = +1 is observed the log-odds opinion
νi increases by a fixed amount and, when sj = −1 is observed, νi decreases by the same
amount. Therefore, by measuring νi in number of steps, we don’t even have to worry
about the step size (this will no longer be true for three-choice problems).
It is easy to introduce agents who withhold judgment in this context. Since pi = 0.5
translates to νi = 0, instead of simply assigning si = sign(νi), we can have a region of
size o around νi = 0, where each agent express no opinion and, therefore, has no influence
on its neighbors. That is, if |νi| < o, then agent i withholds judgment until it is less
uncertain about the problem.
Figure 1 shows the opinion distributions, measured in number of steps away from
changing the choice, after an average of 100 interactions per agent. The agents were
located in a bi-dimensional 64x64 square regular lattice with four neighbors for each
agent. The figure shows the cases where o = 0 (no ignorance) and o = 2 and the initial
conditions where chosen so that the initial opinions were distributed uniformly in a range
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Figure 1: Distribution of the opinions, measured in number of steps away from changing
the choice, when the middle choice is not a real choice, but just a statement of ignorance.
The cases where o = 0 (no ignorance) and o = 2 are both shown. In both cases the intitial
conditions where chosen so that the initial opinions were distributed uniformly in a range
of 2.025 steps away from ν = 0.
of 2.025 steps away from νi = 0. This means that, in the o = 2 case, few agents will have a
stated opinion in the beginning. Since a neighbor with no stated opinion has no influence,
the system evolves slowly at first, while small clusters of likely-minded individuals spread
until most agents have a very strong opinion on the subject. This suggests that, while
extremism has a slower start, once most people express one real option, the behavior of
the system should be similar to that of the model with no agnostic agents.
However, while there is only a small change in the strength of the extremism, the
final configuration of the system shows important differences. Figure 2 shows the final
configuration for both cases presented in Figure 1. We see that for large o, the regions of
individuals that make the same choice become larger and more agents find themselves in
the middle of areas where no dissent is observed. This leads to an important decrease in
the number of agents that live in interfaces between the regions. As a consequence, the
central peaks become less important. That is, while the final extremism is a little weaker,
we observe less agents with moderate opinions. The initial doubt has the counter-intuitive
effect of decreasing doubt in the long run, as clusters become larger and the influence
between the groups, weaker.
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Figure 2: Configuration for the regular square lattice with 64x64 agents when agents can
withhold judgment until they are certain (grey squares show agents who are not certain).
(Left panel) No ignorance (o = 0) (Right panel) Most agents start with no chosen position
(o = 2)
3 Three real choices
To introduce a third real choice, we need to alter the CODA model. We will introduce
three choices, A, B and C. When an agent i chooses A, it sets its choice at si = −1; for
B, si = 0; and, for C, si = +1. In particular, with three choices, the agents need, in the
most general case, estimates of six different conditional probabilities (the nine chances
that each result will be picked given each result is the best less the three normalization
equations). In order to make the problem simpler, we can introduce a few symmetries.
Therefore, we will assume that the chances agents assign to the possibility that each
neighbor will choose the best option is the same for all three options. That is,
P (sj = −1|A) = P (sj = −0|B) = P (sj = +1|C) = a.
Also, by introducing a symmetry between choices A and C, we will have that P (sj =
+1|B) = P (sj = −1|B) = (1− a)/2 (since it must adds to one) and
P (sj = 0|A) = P (sj = 0|C) = b.
This reduces the number of independent likelihoods to two.
The initial probabilities associated with A, B, and C, assigned by agent i will be
represented by pi, qi, and ri, respectively. In order to simplify the notation, the index
i will not be used from now on. Changing the probability variables for ln(p/(1 − p) no
longer simplifies the dynamical equations one obtains from a direct application of Bayes
Theorem. However, if we define
ν1 = ln
(
p
q
)
,
ν2 = ln
(q
r
)
,
ν3 = ln
(
r
p
)
, (1)
where, obviously, ν1+ ν2+ ν3 = 0, we have a set of variables where the process of opinion
change by the use of the Bayes Theorem is still additive. We have that, when the choice
sj = −1 is observed in the neighbor, the variables transform according to
ν1(t+ 1) = ν1(t) + ln
(
2a
1− a
)
,
ν2(t+ 1) = ν2(t) + ln
(
1− a
2(1− a− b)
)
, (2)
where the equation for ν3 was omitted since it is a direct consequence of the previous pair.
If sj = 0 is observed, we have
ν1(t+ 1) = ν1(t) + ln
(
b
a
)
,
ν2(t+ 1) = ν2(t) + ln
(a
b
)
, (3)
and, finally, for sj = +1,
ν1(t+ 1) = ν1(t) + ln
(
2(1− a− b)
1− a
)
,
ν2(t+ 1) = ν2(t) + ln
(
1− a
2a
)
. (4)
From Equation 1 we see that the sign of the variables ν1, ν2 and ν3 define which
probability in the pair used to calculate the variables is larger. Therefore, simply by
checking the signs, it is possible to determine which probability, p, q, or r, is considered
larger by the agent and, therefore, the choice the agent will express.
The problem with the use of variables ν1, ν2 and ν3 is that, while they simplify the
dynamics considerably, they are not related to just one specific choice. Therefore, in order
to interpret the data we will obtain, they need to be translated back to probabilities or
true log-odds in favor of each choice. By solving the Equation 1, we get
l1 = ln
(
p
1− p
)
= ν1 − ln
(
e−ν2 + 1
)
,
l2 = ln
(
q
1− q
)
= ln
(
1
eν1 + e−ν2
)
,
l3 = ln
(
r
1− r
)
= −ν2 + ln (e
ν1 + 1) . (5)
If necessary, one can compute the probabilities directly from the results of Equation 5,
but the values of l1, l2, and l3 are enough to understand the consequences for the system.
Actually, since extreme opinions might evolve, turning the probabilities too close to 0 and
1, they are actually a better choice of variables than p, q, and r.
3.1 Simulations
In order to explore the consequences of introducing a third option in the problem, a series
of simulations was performed. All cases were run in a square bi-dimensional regular lattice
with periodic boundary conditions and interactions with only the four closest neighbors
(von Neumann neighborhood). The initial conditions were chosen by drawing random
numbers uniformly distributed in the interval 1/3 ± 0.1 for each choice. Once the sum
was renormalized to 1, those numbers were used as initial values for p, q, and r. The
largest probability was the criterion for picking each agent choice. That is, at first, there
were no agents with extreme opinions.
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Figure 3: Configuration for the regular square lattice with 64x64 agents when there are
three real choices. In both cases α = 0.7. (Left panel) The si = 0 choice (grey) is identical
as the others and not a middle option (β = (1 − α)/2=0.15). (Right panel) The si = 0
choice is a middle choice and si = 1 and si = −1 are considered very distant (β = 0.29).
Figure 3 shows the stable lattice configuration of choices once after one typical realiza-
tion for each case shown. In the figure, white means the agent at that site chose si = −1,
grey means the middle choice, si = 0, and black corresponds to si = +1. Configurations
for the case where the middle choice is an independent third option (β = (1−α)/2=0.15),
as well as when it is a real middle choice (β = 0.29) are shown. It is easy to see that
there are some important differences between both figures. Notice that β = 0.29 is a
case where each agent thinks it is very unlikely (only 1%) that a neighbor will make an
extreme choice when the opposite choice is the best one (the neighbor j choosing sj = +1,
when A is the best choice, per example). When that happens, we can see that the middle
choice actually survives mostly as a buffer between the white and black areas, as opposed
to the case where the grey choice was independent and behaved in the same way as the
other two.
The strength of the opinions is shown in Figure 4, for the same case as in Figure 3.
Here, the histograms were obtained as average distributions after 20 realizations of the
system. They show the distribution for the log-odds of each log-odds variable associated
with each choice, that is, l1, l2, and l3. As expected, when the s0 choice is an independent
third choice, all three histograms present the same behavior. We can see the appearance
of peaks in the most extreme positions, both for positive l values (agents who choose that
specific option), as well as negative (agents who think that the evaluated option is very
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Figure 4: Opinion distribution for each choice in the regular square lattice with 64x64
agents when there are three real choices. In both cases α = 0.7. (Left panel) The si = 0
choice is identical as the others and not a middle option (β = (1 − α)/2=0.15). (Right
panel) The s0 choice is a middle choice and si = +1 and si = −1 are considered very
distant (β = 0.29).
unlikely to be the best one). As the problem is symmetrical regarding the three options,
it is expected that, in average, each option should attract one third of the choices. This
is what makes the peak of the agents who believe a theory is wrong approximately twice
as high as the peak of agents who think it is right.
The β = 0.29 case shows the disagreement extreme peak much further than the agree-
ment peak for both l1 and l3. This has happened because whenever an agent with a
non-intermediary choice gets its opinion reinforced, the step resulting from Equation 4
against the opposite choice is larger than the reinforcements. Therefore, the opinion
against the opposite opinion (si = −1 or si = +1) ends larger than the opinion in favor of
any of the choices. It is interesting to notice that the opinion against the central option
is never so strong as those against the more non-central choices.
Finally, Figure 5 investigates the interfaces between the different opinions, as we
change β from β = 0.15 to β = 0.29, including the intermediary values, while keep-
ing α = 0.7. The estimates shown are the averages of 20 different realizations and the
error bars were obtained from the standard deviation of the quantities measured. The
left panel shows the proportion of interfaces between si = +1 and si = −1, relative to
the total number of interfaces. Since si = +1 and si = −1 are symmetric, their average
number of interfaces with s0 are equal and, therefore, do not need to be evaluated. We
see that, contrary to what we would expect from the analysis from just the two extreme
cases (β = 0.15 and β = 0.29), the proportion of interfaces between the opposing factions
increase at first and only starts decreasing after β = 0.25.
The reason for this behavior can be understood in the right panel. We see that, as
β increases, the proportion of agents who choose the middle option decreases at first;
around β = 0.25, only as little as 8% of agents keep the intermediary position. Since
there are so few of them, it is natural that most interfaces will not include agents with
the si = 0 choice. However, as β increases even further, this tendency is reversed and
the number of agents who choose the middle option becomes larger. They survive in the
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Figure 5: Effects on the configuration of changing the value of β, while keeping α = 0.7
constant. Each point shows the average result of 20 realizations and the error bars are the
observed standard deviations. (Left panel) The proportion of interfaces between si = +1
and si = −1, relative to the total number of interfaces. (Right panel) Proportion of si = 0
results that survive at the end.
areas between the opposing choices si = +1 and si = −1. Simulations for β = 0.299 show
that the interfaces between the opposite choices actually disappear, in 20 realizations not
even one case of neighbors between si = +1 and si = −1 was observed.
4 Conclusions
We see that, as si = 0 becomes a central option, initially, this option loses its appeal and
is replaced by the two competing extremes. However, if the extremes are such that, if one
of them is true, it is considered very unlikely that a neighbor would choose the opposite
option, the central opinion regain its strength and becomes a buffer between the si = +1
and si = −1. Opinions about each option still remain strong with the introduction of the
third option, as shown by the histograms of the log-odds, but, from a practical point of
view, the existence of agents that have the intermediary opinion acting as buffers could
cause a decrease in extremist problems. It is interesting to see that the middle option
always survive, although it becomes much less important for a range of values.
The introduction of a third option in a binary choice problem, by allowing agents who
are not very sure to not express their opinions until those opinions are strong enough
also had interesting consequences. While a system where most agents have no chosen
factions at first leads to less extreme opinions, due to the fact that for a while there is no
reinforcement while most agents express no choice, the overall effect can not be described
as a diminishing of extremism. As a matter of fact, with few agents with an initial opinion,
the domains can grow larger before the system dynamics freeze them. This has the effect
that a smaller number of agents live in the interfaces and observe both choices. Therefore,
the number of moderates actually decreases as an effect of the agents withholding their
opinions when they are not so certain.
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